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Reputation has become a key factor within today’s 
online platform landscape. In particular for sellers in 
electronic commerce, the management of reputation 
as a signal of trustworthiness has become a relevant 
business activity. Prior studies have focused on either 
the role of reputation within given (but platform-
bound) environments or general data portability 
between platforms. The question of cross-platform 
reputation portability, however, has thus far achieved 
much less attention. With this exploratory work, we 
present survey data on consumers’ perception of 
portable reputation in the platform economy and a 
case study based on actual (seller) market data from 
an e-commerce marketplace. Our results show that 
consumers are generally receptive for imported seller 
reputation. However, for seller ratings to function as 
an effective signaling device across platform 
boundaries, adequate means of representation have 
yet to be found. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The management of reputation and digital identity 
has become imperative for any business that attempts 
to sell products and/or services online [1]. On 
electronic commerce platforms such as Amazon, 
eBay, Gumtree, or Bonanza, sellers build an online 
reputation based on evaluations of prior customers. 
Importantly, sellers rely on this reputation since it 
greatly determines their capability of 1) enforcing 
profitable prices and 2) attracting demand [1], [2]. 
It is quite common that sellers are active on 
multiple platforms (“multi-homing”) and, in this case 
have to manage each reputation separately [2]–[4]. 
Building up such a reputation as a signal of 
trustworthiness towards prospective buyers requires 
effort and is costly [5]. Especially when starting to sell 
through a new channel, the lack of reputation may 
represent a crucial barrier for economic success since, 
from the buyers’ perspective, such sellers represent 
dark horses with no credible track record on the 
platform, a phenomenon which is also referred to as 
the “cold-start” problem [6]. 
This raises the question whether the reputation a 
seller acquires in one platform represents a valuable 
signal of trustworthiness when imported on another 
platform. In other words – and put as a concise 
research question: 
RQ: Can sellers with little or no reputation on a 
platform draw on existing ratings from another 
platform to their benefit? 
With this exploratory work, we address buyers’ 
perceptions and sellers’ economic implications of such 
cross-platform reputation portability. Until now, 
research has devoted broad attention to either a) the 
roles of trust and reputation within the confines of a 
given platform environment [7], [8] or b) the general 
concept of cross-platform data portability [9], [10]. 
Overall, there is still an evident gap of empirical work 
on the portability of reputation between platforms. 
With this work, we seek to address this gap. We do 
so by considering 1) the perception of imported 
reputation from the buyer perspective (Study 1; 
Survey) and 2) the effectiveness of imported 
reputation based on actual market data from an 
e-commerce platform (Study 2; Empirical Data). In a 
nutshell, our results show that e-commerce customers 
state to be receptive for imported reputation in general. 
Specifically, they value the additional information for 
increased levels of reliability and consistency in 
provider ratings—indicating their good (or maybe not 
so good) online behavior across a range of sources. 
Looking at actual market data, however, we observe a 
more intricate picture. While a large fraction of sellers 
makes in fact use of reputation import and 
substantially increases rating scores by this, it does not 
seem to be converted into tangible economic results. 
Quite to the contrary, we observe that reputation 
imports and the resulting improved rating scores are 
associated with less demand and lower prices. We 
discuss these peculiar findings in view of the rapid 





proliferation of the platform economy and alternative 
approaches to reputation management (e.g., 
third-party services, decentralized technology). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. We describe the general idea of cross-
platform reputation portability and review existing 
work on this subject in Section 2. Section 3 then 
reports the results of an online survey in which we 
roughly assess the potential of reputation portability 
from the consumer perspective. We then analyze a 
real-world case of reputation import based on market 
data from 4,506 sellers of an e-commerce platform in 
Section 4. Section 5 provides a general discussion of 
our findings—linking them to current developments in 
policy making and technology. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
2.1 Trust and reputation on platforms 
 
Today’s online platform landscape is ubiquitous, 
transforming almost every industry, and pervading 
many levels of modern economic activity [11], [12]. 
Digital platforms, such as Amazon, eBay, Taobao, and 
others mediate transactions between sellers and buyers 
by providing them with means to exchange goods and 
services online. For a platform business to thrive, the 
willingness of buyers and sellers to engage in 
transactions is imperative. For this to happen, the most 
important antecedent is the establishment and 
maintenance of trust between prospective transaction 
partners. Hence, trust and reputation have been a 
popular research objects within and across platform 
ecosystems over the past decades [1], [7]. 
In the context of digital platforms, a seller’s 
reputation is usually referred to as the accumulated 
and documented evaluation by prior transaction 
partners based on their experiences with this seller 
[13]. Reputation systems aggregate transaction-based 
feedback into individual buyers’ rating scores to 
function, inter alia, as a signal of trustworthiness [2], 
[14], [15]. Since their introduction in electronic 
commerce, reputation systems have been designed and 
developed to insert trust in online transactions by 
providing “future buyers with a window into a seller’s 
past behavior with previous buyers” [1, p. 326]. 
Besides the use of reputation systems to aggregate 
third-party assessments, today, all major platforms 
deploy a variety of trust-enhancing mechanisms that 
allow users (e.g., buyers, sellers, hosts, renters, etc.) to 
showcase a track-record for reputable online conduct 
[16]. Yet, feedback by others, that is, third-party 
ratings (e.g., 1-5 stars, positive/negative) or written 
assessment (i.e., text reviews) still represents the most 
frequently used signals to demonstrate trustworthiness 
in digital environments [4], [17]. 
There is a wide range of studies on the effects of 
these reputational elements within a given platform 
environment—both regarding their impact on buyers’ 
perceptions of a seller’s trustworthiness and, in turn, 
on the implied economics of seller reputation. First, 
ratings and reviews have been shown to positively 
influence buyers’ trust in prospective sellers in a 
variety of platform contexts. For instance, for previous 
buyers’ comments on eBay [7] or, similarly, written 
feedback from prior transaction partners on sharing 
economy platforms [18], [19], as well as for star 
ratings and text reviews on Airbnb [20], [21],  
Second, a plethora of research investigates the 
resulting economic effects of higher trustworthiness, 
namely, the intuitive theoretical claim that it both 
drives demand/bids from potential buyers and allows 
sellers to set and enforce higher prices. We refer to 
Bajari & Hortaçsu [22], Dellarocas et al. [2], and 
Tadelis [1] for more comprehensive overviews of 
studies reporting empirical evidence for higher sales 
probability and price premiums obtained by more 
reputable sellers. 
 
2.2 Reputation portability 
 
Reputation portability can be defined as “the 
effectiveness of a user’s reputation on a source 
platform (e.g., a star rating score) in building trust on 
a different platform” [4, p. 231]. Considering the 
documented effects of reputation within a specific 
marketplace and the increasing “platformization” of 
our world, it seems natural to ask questions regarding 
the permeability of online reputation across platform 
borders—especially, since the idea of portable 
reputation is anything but new. 
In the 1990s, eBay and Amazon introduced early 
versions of reputation systems and—for some time—
Amazon allowed its sellers to directly import their 
ratings from eBay [14]. Back then, it seemed as though 
this might become a common practice, however, 
apparently eBay was not appreciative of the fact. Upon 
claims of their ratings being proprietary accompanied 
by legal threats, Amazon had to discontinue the 
service [2]. 
There is a lively debate among legal scholars with 
regard to the ownership of transaction-based feedback 
in the form of reviews—and hence regarding its ability 
to be ported between platforms. In 2018, the EU 
introduced the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) in an effort to foster and enable 
unprecedented competition in online markets by 
breaking the monopoly of incumbents and large 
platforms [23]. In fact, GPDR’s Article 20 mandates 
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platform operators to grant “data subjects” the explicit 
right to data portability. Note that any individual who 
provides data to the platform is subject to the 
regulation, that is, both buyers and sellers. Legal 
scholars have welcomed the new legislation as a 
promising step and strong tool to allow for increased 
competition between digital platforms and give 
individuals more control over personal data [24], [25]. 
However, given a lack of clear interpretations it needs 
to be clarified what type of data is supposed to be 
ported from one platform to another [9], [26]—and if 
GDPR in its current form encompasses reputational 
information. Reputation data (both in the form of text 
reviews and ratings) is usually provided by others, that 
is, prior transaction partners, in particular buyers. In 
the case of text reviews, Kathuria & Lai [25] conclude 
that ownership would most likely be with the author or 
the platform—but not with the individual seller. 
Further, based on third-party (star) ratings, platforms 
calculate proprietary aggregated scores via their 
reputation systems. The exact scope of data 
encompassed by GDPR is certainly debatable, 
however, since sellers do not provide these rating 
themselves, Article 20 is unlikely to cover them either 
[27], [28]. Also, obligatory (or better yet: “forced”) 
interoperability to design systems so that data 
portability is supported was taken out of the 
regulation—again following critical acclaims from the 
platforms themselves [10]. In anticipation of a 
prisoner’s dilemma—even though platforms would 
win over sellers by offering reputation import, they 
may eventually weaken their position due to increased 
competition—Krämer [29] suggests large players may 
silently agree to not offer such functionality for direct 
competitors. 
However unlikely that leading platforms will offer 
reputation import any time soon, the economic 
benefits for sellers and entrant platforms are apparent: 
for instance, avoidance of platform lock-in due to 
network effects, decreased switching cost, and 
mitigation of the “cold-start” problem without prior 
on-site reputation. 
Somewhat surprisingly—given the reluctance of 
long-established platforms such as eBay and Amazon 
to offer reciprocal import functionality—it is still 
possible to have a seller’s ratings ported from those 
platforms to newer, alternative e-commerce 
marketplaces. Bonanza and TrueGether, for instance, 
do  promote the direct import of both Amazon and 
eBay ratings into sellers’ profiles on their platform 
[30], [31]. On Bonanza, a seller’s eBay rating (i.e., 
positive/neutral/negative) is translated into the 
equivalent value on a 5-star rating scheme (i.e., 5, 3, 
or 1 stars), while on TrueGether both the external 
rating as well as the corresponding feedback text are 
displayed. We analyze the dynamics of imported 
reputation on these platforms in the next section. 
These practical approaches come well-supported 
by calls for reputation portability to become the gold 
standard. Resnick et al. [14] have made this remark 
almost two decades ago stating the difficulty 
stemming from “the lack of portability from system to 
system” (p. 48). More recently, Puschmann & Alt 
[32], in the context of sharing economy platforms, 
posed the question how users (from both market sides) 
may connect their various profiles to comprehensively 
manage their online identity. Following the same line 
of thought, a recent EU report identifies “cross-
platform reputation portability” as an important 
concept to address issues of data ownership, 
prohibitive switching costs, lock-in effects, and 
platform competition [33]. Finally, Gans [34] suggests 
a broader notion of “identity portability” based on the 
artifacts used by platforms to generate reputation (i.e., 
ratings and reviews). 
As much advocacy there may historically be, the 
hypothesized value of portable reputation has so far 
not been corroborated by empirical insight. There has 
been some quantitative work on the potential of 
previously earned reputational data to predict 
trustworthiness and future performance. However, this 
has either been based on social media data (as opposed 
to transaction-based reputation; [35]) or analysis was 
limited to different categories within the same 
platform [36]. 
Only recently, first studies have set out to 
investigate the effectiveness of portable reputation 
from the consumer’s perspective [19], [37]. Otto et al. 
[37] use a controlled experiment to display imported 
ratings from Airbnb (a platform for peer-to-peer 
accommodation rental) to potential passengers on 
BlaBlaCar (a ridesharing platform). Based on self-
reported scales, they find that imported signals 
positively impact trust in prospective drivers on the 
platform. Similarly, Zloteanu et al. [19] use a 
hypothetical scenario and present study participants 
with different types of trust and reputation information 
(“TRI”)—among which “online market reputation” 
denotes imported ratings from other platforms (in this 
case Airbnb and Uber). They find that the availability 
of TRI increases the perceptions of prospective hosts’ 
trustworthiness as well as participants willingness to 
book a stay. However, it is neither possible to attribute 
this effect entirely to imported ratings nor to assess the 
latter’s general importance from a consumer 
perspective, since the authors did not explicitly control 
for it (or chose to not report it). Teubner et al. [4] use 
survey data to emphasize today’s platform 
multiplicity. They show that almost two out of three 
respondents are active on more than one platform, 
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underlining their claim for the relevance of “reputation 
transfer”. Following up on this, Teubner et al. [38] 
show that star ratings bear trust-building potential also 
across platform boundaries for several platforms (i.e., 
Airbnb, BlaBlaCar, eBay, Uber) and that thematic fit 
between source and target context is an important 
criterion for cross-platform signaling to be effective. 
For a comprehensive literature review on reputation 
portability, we refer to Hesse & Teubner [39]. 
Overall, the outlined studies unanimously find 
reputation portability to be effective, however they all 
rely on survey data, that is, on self-reported scales and 
assessments made by the participants. Given that such 
approaches are prone to intention-behavior gaps [40], 
we complement this view by additional data-based 
insights into the workings of portable reputation. In the 
next section, we report the results from a consumer 
survey on perceptions of portable reputation. We then 
explore the effects of reputation imports based on 
actual market data (Bonanza.com). This allows us to 
empirically assess the impact of imported reputation 
on sellers’ ability to a) attract demand and b) enforce 
higher prices—and come to a surprising result. To the 
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to do so. 
 
3. A survey on portable reputation 
 
3.1 Study design and data 
 
In the first study, we conducted an online survey in 
which participants evaluated different means of online 
reputation and trust. Specifically, participants took the 
role of buyers and evaluated the concept of sellers with 
imported ratings and/or reviews. We recruited 204 
participants via Prolific.ac [41], ensuring respondents 
had sufficient experience in online shopping on 
electronic commerce platforms (i.e., at least once a 
month) and represented a diverse global audience (i.e., 
Northern America, EU, Middle East). A total of 187 
participants remained after attention and completeness 
checks. Using a between-subjects design, participants 
were assigned to scenarios on five different types of 
online platforms: accommodation (e.g., Airbnb, 
Homestay), P2P carsharing (e.g., easyCarClub, 
Getaround), crowd work (e.g., TaskRabbit, Helpling), 
e-commerce (e.g., eBay, Bonanza), and mobility (e.g., 
Uber, Lyft). Based on our previous work on the subject 
[4], [38], [39], we introduced the concept of reputation 
portability as the availability of additional reputation 
elements (i.e., star ratings and text reviews)—
pertaining to a prospective provider but stemming 
from a different platform. Participants then rated the 
importance of these additional trust cues in deciding to 
buy from a prospective provider (single item 
construct; 7-point Likert scales). We added an open-
ended question asking why (if at all) and in which 
cases subjects considered imported reputation to be 
helpful for their decision process. These textual 
statements were reviewed to identify distinct aspects 
mentioned by participants (e.g., importance of fit 
between platforms; helpfulness for new providers). 




Figure 1 summarizes the results of the survey and 
shows platform-specific differences. It becomes 
evident that respondents generally value the concept 
of reputation portability for e-commerce, scoring 5.6 
on the importance Likert scale (1 to 7; corresponding 
to 76.67% when standardized). Remarkably, other 
platform types (i.e., accommodation, crowd work, 
mobility) exhibit higher scores for imported 
reputation. One potential explanation for these 
differences may root in the fact that those platforms 
facilitate co-sharing and physical encounters are 
prerequisite to service provision, that is, there occurs a 
generally higher degree of social interaction [42]. 
Hence, they may require higher levels of “inserted” 
trust from external sources. 
Another observation concerns the preferred trust 
signal survey participants would like to see being 
imported from other platforms. Here, participants 
appreciated written text reviews over star ratings on all 
platforms except those for mobility services. 
The reason for that can be found in the verbal 
statements. Participants were asked to comment 
whether, why, and how (i.e., under which 
circumstances) imported reputation would be helpful 
to them. As for their preference for text reviews, some 
participants mentioned star rating scale skewness as a 
limiting factor (“people usually assign stars/points in 
extremes”). In fact, positively skewed star rating 
Figure 1. Importance of portable reputation 
and preferred signal for import 
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distributions represent a common phenomenon for 
many online platforms [16], [43], [44]. In that sense, 
text reviews appealed as “more informative” and to 
provide a “clearer picture”. 
Main reasons in favor of imported reputation were 
the general surplus of details (e.g., “the more 
information the better”; 30 times), the ability to prove 
a provider’s good (or bad) conduct on other platforms 
(26 times), or the opportunity to check on 
consistency/reliability of ratings (e.g., could be 
“bought”, “fake”, fabricated”, or “written by oneself”; 
20 times). In particular, imported reputation was 
considered as potentially helpful as it allows novel 
providers with no or little on-site reputation to mitigate 
the platform-inherent cold-start problem (18 times). 
Specifically, one respondent stated that reputation 
portability could help in demonstrating an “honest 
online footprint”. 
Additionally, the issue of sellers getting rid of “a 
string of bad reviews” and “play[ing] the system by 
using another platform” was repeatedly brought up (15 
times). That is, consumers would want the critical 
reviews from other platforms to show up. In this sense, 
it could prevent bad actors from successfully 
continuing their poor game by starting over and over 
on new platforms. 
Last, the relevance of the fit between source and 
target platforms for porting reputation received 
considerable attention (14 times). On the one hand, 
participants noted that the source platform should be 
well-known, reputable, and trustworthy itself to instill 
confidence in the ratings’ reliability and credibility. 
On the other hand, the service offering on source and 
target platforms should be compatible and relevant to 
each other because, as one participant neatly put it, “a 
fishmonger is not a good butcher” – an observation 




4. Reputation import on Bonanza.com 
 
4.1. Study Design and Data 
 
In this second study, we follow up the first study’s 
findings and investigate how importing reputation 
affects sellers’ market success, that is, their capability 
to 1) enforce price mark-ups and 2) attract demand. In 
this sense, we now investigate the overall effect of the 
reputation import strategy from an empirical 
perspective, that is, based on actual market data. 
Naturally, this approach is limited to uncovering that 
certain effects occur but cannot speak to how or why 
specifically they may appear. Thus, our approach is 
prone to issues of observational studies such as 
omitted variables which we come back to it in the 
general discussion. 
We collected data from Bonanza.com, an 
e-commerce platform that markets itself as an eBay 
alternative. It targets business sellers, being a 
“marketplace that empowers entrepreneurs to build a 
sustainable business based on repeat customers” [45]. 
Founded in 2008, the platform hosts about 50,000 
registered sellers with an overall inventory of 
35 million items. Using a web-crawler to query the 
platform, we collected openly accessible data for a 
total of 4,506 sellers and 124,067 items. The data was 
collected at two instances in April and May 2019.  
For analysis, we consider individual sellers. For 
each seller, we consider data on i) overall rating score 
(1-5 stars in steps of 0.1 stars), ii) average price of their 
items, iii) number of transactions on the platform, and 
iv) whether they have imported ratings from eBay or 
not (binary variable: yes/no). Moreover, we retrieved 
information on how many items a seller offers through 
the platform as well as their total number of reviews 
as an approximation of business size. 
The first pass of data collection in April 2019 was 
followed by a second pass four weeks later. This 
longitudinal data structure allows us to account for 
Table 1. OLS regression models (standard errors in parentheses) 
   i. Score   ii. Price   iii. Demand 
Imported Reviews (y/n)  .450 ***  -.314    .914   -.681 ***   -.459 ** 
  (.016)    (.783)       (.846)    (.144)       (.156)   
Score (1-5)       -2.431 *** -2.727 ***    -.641 *** -.492 *** 
            (.664)   (.718)        (.123)   (.133)   
#Reviews (10³)  .001 *  -.073 *** -.068 ** -.070 **  .019 *** .019 *** .020 *** 
  (.000)   (.021)  (.021)  (.021)   (.004)  (.004)  (.004)  
#Items (10³)  -.002 **  .124 *** .117 *** .118 ***  .098 *** .097 *** .097 *** 
  (.001)   (.033)  (.033)  (.033)   (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  
Intercept  4.519 ***  19.519 *** 31.236 *** 31.844 ***  1.570 *** 4.101 *** 3.796 *** 
  (.016)   (.761)  (3.286)  (3.334)   (.140)  (.607)  (.615)   
#Observations  4,506    4,506   4,506   4,506    4,506   4,506   4,506   
R2   .152     .005   .008   .008     .077   .078   .080   
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 
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sellers’ capability of generating additional sales, that 
is, of attracting demand (i.e., delta between t=2 and 
t=1), as a result of their rating score in t=1. 
Specifically, in contrast to “snapshot” data at only one 
single point of time, this approach reduces 
endogeneity issues which make inferences on causal 
effects notoriously difficult. The data can be 
characterized as follows: 
i. The Score reflects a seller’s average star rating 
score (1-5 stars). Without import (n=270): 4.52 
stars; with import (n=4,236): 4.97 stars. 
ii. The Price represents a seller’s average price 
across their items (without import: 19.82$; 
with import: 19.22$). 
iii. Demand describes a seller’s number of new 
transactions over the 4 weeks between data 
collection 1 and 2 (without import: 1.81; 
with import: 1.12). 
iv. Average number of Reviews 
a. On Bonanza (without import: 21.85; 
with import: 9.85) 
b. Imported from eBay (without import: 0; 




Overall, 94% of sellers import reputation. And for 
9 out of 10 sellers who import reputation, the imported 
ratings make up for more than 95% of their total 
number of ratings. Now, in order to further understand 
the specific characteristics of and differences between 
sellers with and without reputation imports, we 
conduct a series of OSL regressions on the 
above-mentioned focus variables. Table 1 summarizes 
the regression models for the three dependent 
variables Score (Model I), Price (Models II-IV), and 
Demand (Models V-VII) based on observed values 
from 4,506 sellers on Bonanza.com. First, confirming 
the observation from above, average rating scores are 
significantly higher for sellers with imported ratings 
by about half a star (b=.450, p<.001). Moreover, 
controlling for a seller’s characteristics shows that the 
respective number of ratings and items have 
significant (but minuscule) effects on rating score 
(b=.001, p<.05; b=-.002; p<.01; per thousand 
ratings/items each). 
Next, to assess the economic effect of importing/ 
not importing reputation, we consider regression 
models for price and demand. The price models show 
that higher star rating scores are negatively related to 
average prices (b=-2.727, p<.001) and that, beyond 
this, importing reviews has no significant price effect 
(b=.914, n.s.). Next, also the demand regressions show 
that higher star rating scores are negatively related to 
demand, that is, the number of sales a seller had 
between the two points of observation (b=-.492, 
p<.001). Importantly, we observe that beyond this 
rating score effect, there occurs an additional negative 
effect based on importing itself (b=-.459, p<.01). 
Thus, even for identical rating scores, sellers who have 
imported ratings attract less additional demand as 
compared to sellers who did not import. 
Overall, these observations are puzzling, to say the 
least. The negative relation between higher rating 
scores and prices/ demand is counter-intuitive from a 
common-sense perspective and inconsistent with 
theory and most of the literature. There exist, however, 
some studies that report similar negative relations 
between reputation and economic indicators [2] and 
we offer some approaches of explanation in the 
general discussion. Importantly, when excluding the 
control variables from the models, none of the 
coefficients change in terms of sign, magnitude, or 
significance.  
Now, as a seller’s economic success can be well 
conflated by revenue (R), which emerges as the 
interaction of price (p) and demand (d). Hence, 
revenue can be graphically interpreted as the area of a 
rectangle with edges p and d, where R=p·d. Figure 2 
shows average prices and demand for sellers with 
versus without imported reputation (standard errors 
indicated by error bars in both dimensions). We see 
that the overall revenue difference between importing/ 
not importing reputation is primarily driven by the 
lower additional demand rather than by the difference 
of average prices (Figure 2). 
 
5. General Discussion 
 
Full transparency of previous online conduct 
across digital platforms—as appreciated by some of 
our survey participants—would entail far-reaching Figure 2. Revenue difference decomposition 
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implications. Having bad reviews showing up 
everywhere we interact online would pose a 
considerable threat to Western world liberal values. 
Along those lines, China is—as we speak—in fact 
implementing a national reputation scheme (“Social 
Credit System”) that penalizes and rewards 
individuals and businesses [46], [47]. Importantly, the 
system explicitly includes online behavior such as 
electronic shopping and social media conduct. By 
2020, it intends to assess every citizen nation-wide 
with a unique, standardized, and publicly ranked 
score. Although most Western observers reject these 
plans outright (e.g., as dystopian or “Orwellian”), 
others suggest that—with the ubiquity of digital 
platforms, predictive algorithms, and scoring 
mechanisms—the Western world is not too far away 
from the Chinese system of networked shame [48]. 
The EU will have to find its own position in dealing 
with this development. The GDPR currently grants 
individuals the right to erasure (also labeled as “right 
to be forgotten”; Article 17). This entitles them to have 
their personal data (stored by platforms) deleted. 
Whether this also pertains to any reputational data—
provided by others as previously discussed—is still up 
to clarification. 
However, cherry-picking only the best ratings to be 
ported from a given platform (or choosing just those 
platforms where one has collected good average 
ratings) seems unreasonable, too. To prevent this 
scenario of “takeaway trust” ad libitum, systems could 
be designed in a way that leaves the seller with a 
choice: either import all available reviews (full 
transparency) or none at all. In that sense, it would 
provide sellers with the discretional option to disclose 
their previous ratings [2]. This could create an 
incentive for impeccable online behavior and may be 
more in line with the foreseeable position of the EU 
between the US (reputation capitalism) and China 
(reputation tyranny) as providing a third way: 
reputation sovereignty. 
We also learned that the source-target fit of a 
platform is of crucial importance when considering 
portable reputation (e.g., a great Airbnb host could be 
a nightmarish driver). Services might not be 
comparable across platforms and what is considered 
good in one environment may not be such a desirable 
treat in another [38]. Furthermore, ratings may hardly 
be comparable when, for instance, one platform 
exhibits skewness towards highly positive scores 
whereas another might show a much more dispersed 
rating distribution [16]. 
 
A puzzling market—As suggested by theory and 
common sense, there should be a positive relation 
between reputation and buyers’ capability to attract 
demand as well as pricing power. However, there have 
also been findings in the opposite direction suggesting 
either limited effects of reputation or effects in the 
“wrong” direction [2]. For Bonanza.com, we also 
observe a negative relation between rating scores and 
demand/ prices. Importantly, this also holds when 
considering only sellers without imported reputation. 
Given these admittedly puzzling results, several (in 
parts rather speculative) approaches for explanation 
come to mind. While survey participants expressed a 
preference for text reviews as the to-be-imported 
signal, only star ratings are available which may 
impair their effect. Import functions may hence be 
extended to textual information too. Also, as shown by 
the cross-domain comparison (Figure 1), importing 
reputation is considered as relatively unimportant for 
platforms such as eBay/Bonanza as compared to other 
domains with higher degrees of social interaction. 
Thus, albeit being one of very few platforms on which 
reputation imports can be studied, Bonanza.com may 
not be the best or most promising venue to do so. In 
this sense, our findings may underestimate the 
potential benefits of reputation imports. 
Also, a mechanism of reverse causality may cause 
“less expensive” sellers to be perceived as having a 
better price-value, which is why they, in turn, receive 
better reviews. Hence, rather than sellers’ reputation 
forcing/allowing them to set lower/higher prices, the 
prices themselves may trigger biased ratings. This, 
however, is still at odds with most prior research on 
the economic effects of reputation, where, very 
broadly, positive effects are reported. Specifically, the 
latter rationale cannot explain why sellers with better 
reputation at a certain point in time receive less 
demand subsequently. Another explanation could be 
that Bonanza.com represents a secondary sales 
channel for many sellers through which they sell off 
their stock at discounts. Following this logic, 
especially large (and successful) eBay sellers may 
treat their Bonanza accounts with less care. To address 
this, a promising way forward could be to link the 
Bonanza profiles back to their eBay counterparts. In 
addition, a more frequent sampling of larger sets of 
Bonanza profiles could allow for a comparison of 
sellers before and after they have imported ratings, 
enabling difference-in-differences estimation or 
regression discontinuity designs. In view of our 
findings, one should critically ask whether importing 
large amounts (i.e., thousands) of ratings and reviews 
to a context in which typical sellers have only very few 
ratings, somehow disturbs the effectiveness of market 
signaling altogether. Last, issues could also root in the 
quite different group sizes of the “treatment/control” 
groups. Overall, given the exploratory nature of this 
work, it is far too early to draw stark theoretical 
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conclusions. Clearly, in light of the quite puzzling 
results and the outlined limitations of this study, more 
research based on larger data sets is needed to better 
understand the intricacies that govern reputation, 
price, and demand for reputation portability in general, 
and for Bonanza.com in particular. 
Overall, our findings also prompt the question 
whether the cross-platform employment of reputation 
can and/or should be done differently. Should today’s 
platforms, for instance, continue to forgo the 
implementation of user-friendly import mechanisms, 
Personal Information Management Services (PIMS) 
and blockchain technology may provide means to 
make reputation portability a more prevalent reality in 
the future. 
 
Alternatives to direct import—Rather than drawing 
on direct “end-to-end” import, there may exist viable 
alternatives to realize portable reputation. For 
instance, PIMS as third-party services, aggregate and 
verify (reputational) data from disparate sources. 
Based on the combined data (e.g., ratings/reviews, 
verified social/professional accounts, personal IDs) 
these companies build individual trust-based data 
management tools, profiles, and dashboards. PIMS 
can best be understood as a data intermediary with the 
primary aim of putting people in control over their 
own reputation and digital identity [49]. However, 
such services have thus far been mostly unsuccessful 
with many failed attempts (e.g., trustcloud.com 
famust.com, peertru.st, tru.ly). Today, these services 
still struggle to develop profitable business models and 
to gain market recognition [4]. 
Likewise, several endeavors based on blockchain 
(more generally: distributed ledger) technology 
promise to empower individuals with more control 
over their data—irrespective of intermediaries [50], 
[51]. Indeed, the technology’s potential for portable 
reputation lies in its ability to decentralize control and 
ownership over (reputational) data [52]. In that way, it 
could break today’s siloed (i.e., platform-bound) 
approach to reputation in favor of alternative business 
models for cross-platform portability [53]. Especially, 
given the prevalence of “multi-homing” strategies 
with sellers/providers offering their services on 
several platforms, a blockchain-based marketplace 
could become a trusted, decentralized peer-to-peer 
network where participants retain full control over 
their data [52]. Reputation in these environments 
could seamlessly roam across platform boundaries 
since it could be verified with ease, reside with 
individual sellers, and be built across a range of 
markets. Catalini & Gans [54] envision this as an open 
reputation platform with the “ability to port and use 
the resulting reputation scores across different services 
and contexts” (p. 22). Eventually, combining PIMS’ 
value proposition of self-sovereign identity 
management with technology to build decentralized 
platforms may just be the right approach in factually 




Digital platforms have become pervasive in 
basically all our daily lives. Specifically, two-sided 
platforms have emerged as a quasi-standard within 
electronic commerce. In view of the ever-increasing 
importance of this platform economy as well as its 
rules, mechanisms, and paradigms, we expect that 
reputation and specifically its fluidity will gain further 
importance for online businesses such as sellers on 
e-commerce marketplaces. With this first empirical 
account on actual reputation imports, we hope to 
contribute to and spark an ongoing scientific and 
public debate. Additionally, we expect the general 
topic of reputation portability to fuel a vivid legal 
discourse in view of privacy regulation, data 
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